A Social Choice Trade-off Between Alternative Fairness Concepts: Solidarity versus Flexibility

In this paper, we define simple measures of two properties that social choice functions may embody in different degrees in public goods environments. First, a measure of solidarity is proposed such that Thomson's (1990) replacement monotonicity property is a particular case in which the full amount of solidarity is required. Secondly, we introduce a measure of the degree of flexibility of a social choice function and prove that a trade-off in Campbell and Kelly's (1993) sense exists between both properties. More solidarity can only be achieved in exchange of less flexibility of the decision rule. When we restrict ourselves to the family of voting schemes called generalized Condorcet winner solutions, introduced by Moulin (1980), we find the exact trade-off and we can easily find the degrees of fulfillment of both properties, which amount to some generalization of the idea of ''qualified majority''.Single-peaked preferences, solidarity, welfare domination under preference replacement

The Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Clustering.

Clustering methods group individuals or objects based on information about their similarity or proximity. When the raw information to generate the clusters cannot be easily observed or verified, the clusters designer must rely on information reported on individuals behind the observations. When individuals receive utility from a public decision taken with aggregated data within each own's cluster and have single-peaked preferences, we prove that there do not exist cluster methods such that truth-revealing behavior is always a dominant strategy.clustering methods, strategy-proofness, single-peaked preferences, public decision.

Strategy-Proof Estimators for Simple Regression

In this paper we propose a whole class of estimators (“clockwise repeated median estimators” or CRM) for the simple regression model that are immune to manipulation by the agents generating the data. Although strategic considerations affecting the stability of the estimated parameters in regression models have already been studied (the Lucas critique), few efforts have been made to design estimators that are incentive compatible. We find that some well-known robust estimators proposed in the literature like the resistant line method are included in our family. Finally, we also undertake a Monte Carlo study to compare the distribution of some estimators that are robust to data manipulation with the OLS estimators under some specific data manipulation process.strategy-proofness, single-peaked preferences, robust regression, data contamination.

Técnicas para fomentar la participación en clase, el aprendizaje autónomo y la mejora en el rendimiento académico

Memoria ID12-0132. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2012-2013

The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions

[EN]The Lazarillo of Tormes' picaresque novel introduces a story where two subjects sequentially extract (one, two or three) tokens from a common pool in an asymmetric information framework (the first player cannot observe her partners' actions). By introducing a reward for both subjects in case that in every period at least one subject had taken one single token, we define an interesting coordination game. We conduct an experiment with 120 undergraduate students to study their behavior in this framework. We find that if the second player is allowed to take more tokens than her partner, then the frequency of cooperators does not seem to be affected by the informational asymmetry. Nevertheless, this asymmetry (i) incentives the second player to use her 'power of extraction' while the social externality is still available, (ii) yields to more asymmetric profit distributions when subjects win the social externality and (iii) delays the breach period in case of coordination failure. Furthermore, the first choice of the first player is determinant for getting the reward

The impact of economic policy uncertainty and monetary policy on R&D investment: An option pricing approach

Producción CientíficaThis paper adopts a real options approach to investigate the effects of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and monetary policy on R&D investment. Using a panel of U.S. firms over the period 2000-2019, we show that higher (lower) EPU and contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy exert a positive (negative) and significant influence on R&D investment. Our findings shed light on the counter-intuitive behavior of R&D investments, which may help policymakers to anticipate such collateral effects.Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (project PID2020-114797GB-I00

Nuevas estrategias docentes en las clases prácticas de Teoría Macroeconómica: el apoyo de expertos como metodología proactiva en el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje

Memoria ID-0097. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2014-2015

Implementación de técnicas innovadoras en la docencia de la Macroeconomía

Memoria ID-0179. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2016-2017

Aplicación de estrategias y metodologías educativas innovadoras en las clases de Macroeconomía

Memoria ID-0089. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2017-2018

Nuevas formas didácticas de aprender en macroeconomía

Memoria ID-085. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2019-2020